AI System Design

Architecture-first workspace for LLM applications, RAG systems, AI agents, multi-agent workflows, and governed autonomous execution — incorporating NIST AI RMF, NIST AI 600-1, and EU AI Act

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Architecture Intent

Model-Aware Architecture

The model is a capability inside a distributed system, not the whole system. Design identity, data flow, retrieval, orchestration, observability, and fallback around it.

Zero Trust AI Access

Prompts, retrieved context, embeddings, memory, tool calls, generated outputs, and logs are treated as protected assets. Apply continuous identity, device, location, risk, data-sensitivity, and action-context checks before model access, retrieval, memory use, or tool execution — using established Zero Trust and Conditional Access patterns from your identity provider (e.g., Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM Identity Center).

Trade-Off Driven

Every design choice should explain the selected option, the rejected option, and the cost, latency, quality, privacy, or operational impact accepted.

Least-Privilege Agent Authority

Agents should never inherit broad human or platform permissions. Tool access must be scoped, authorized, logged, and revoked when risk changes.

Grounded and Evaluated Outputs

Use retrieval, citations, validation, test sets, red-team scenarios, and human review where AI output must be trusted or acted upon.

Operational Resilience

Design the AI platform as an operations-grade system with capacity controls, cost governance, lifecycle management, model rollback, and measurable service health.

Threat-Informed Design

Map design controls to the full adversarial ML attack taxonomy (NIST AI 100-2e2025): evasion, data poisoning, backdoor/trojan, model extraction, membership inference, and prompt injection — aligned with MITRE ATLAS techniques and OWASP LLM Top 10 application-layer controls.

Graceful Degradation

When model, vector index, tool API, or guardrail services fail, the system should degrade safely rather than fail open or take uncontrolled action.

Incomplete Defense Acknowledgment

Prompt injection, particularly indirect injection via external content, has no known complete defense as of 2025. Defense-in-depth reduces risk but cannot eliminate it for high-assurance contexts requiring human approval gates.