Architecture Intent
Model-Aware Architecture
The model is a capability inside a distributed system, not the whole system. Design identity, data flow, retrieval, orchestration, observability, and fallback around it.
Zero Trust AI Access
Prompts, retrieved context, embeddings, memory, tool calls, generated outputs, and logs are treated as protected assets. Apply continuous identity, device, location, risk, data-sensitivity, and action-context checks before model access, retrieval, memory use, or tool execution — using established Zero Trust and Conditional Access patterns from your identity provider (e.g., Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM Identity Center).
Trade-Off Driven
Every design choice should explain the selected option, the rejected option, and the cost, latency, quality, privacy, or operational impact accepted.
Least-Privilege Agent Authority
Agents should never inherit broad human or platform permissions. Tool access must be scoped, authorized, logged, and revoked when risk changes.
Grounded and Evaluated Outputs
Use retrieval, citations, validation, test sets, red-team scenarios, and human review where AI output must be trusted or acted upon.
Operational Resilience
Design the AI platform as an operations-grade system with capacity controls, cost governance, lifecycle management, model rollback, and measurable service health.
Threat-Informed Design
Map design controls to the full adversarial ML attack taxonomy (NIST AI 100-2e2025): evasion, data poisoning, backdoor/trojan, model extraction, membership inference, and prompt injection — aligned with MITRE ATLAS techniques and OWASP LLM Top 10 application-layer controls.
Graceful Degradation
When model, vector index, tool API, or guardrail services fail, the system should degrade safely rather than fail open or take uncontrolled action.
Incomplete Defense Acknowledgment
Prompt injection, particularly indirect injection via external content, has no known complete defense as of 2025. Defense-in-depth reduces risk but cannot eliminate it for high-assurance contexts requiring human approval gates.
AI Risk Governance
AI RMF Operating Functions
Use Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage as the lifecycle operating model for AI risk decisions, ownership, assessment, monitoring, and treatment.
Trustworthiness Characteristics
Design for valid and reliable behavior, safety, security and resilience, accountability and transparency, explainability and interpretability, privacy enhancement, and harmful-bias management.
NIST AI 600-1 GenAI Risk Taxonomy
Screen the design for generative-AI risks unique to, or exacerbated by, model generation, retrieval, tool use, agentic execution, and synthetic content creation. Twelve risk areas from the March 2024 Generative AI Profile.
EU AI Act Obligations
Classify the system under the EU AI Act risk tiers. Prohibited practices must be blocked at design time. High-risk AI systems require conformity assessment, technical documentation, human oversight, bias testing, accuracy and robustness standards, and registration in the EU database before market placement.
Risk-to-Control Traceability
Each high-risk AI behavior should trace to questionnaire evidence, design factor, security EPIC, pattern selection, trade-off rationale, test case, and monitoring signal.
Governance Evidence
Capture model card inputs, data lineage, prompt versions, retrieval source policy, evaluation results, red-team findings, approval decisions, incident records, and exception handling.
Decision Gates
Require explicit review before production release, model/provider change, new tool enablement, new sensitive data class, increased autonomy, or expanded user population.
Sector Regulations
Layer sector-specific frameworks — HIPAA, PCI DSS, SOX, GDPR, DORA (financial AI), MiFID II — over the AI-specific governance baseline. Requirements may restrict model hosting, data residency, explainability, and human oversight depth.
AI RMF Design Mapping
| Function | Design Meaning | Architecture Evidence | Control Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Govern | Define policy, accountability, roles, risk tolerance, ownership, and escalation paths. | AI ownership model, acceptable-use policy, approval gates, exception register, risk appetite. | AI risk decisions are owned, reviewable, and enforceable. |
| Map | Understand use case, context, data, stakeholders, impact, threat surface, and deployment environment. | System context, data classification, users, tools, model providers, affected parties, impact analysis. | Architecture scope and risk boundaries are explicit before implementation. |
| Measure | Evaluate model behavior, retrieval quality, safety, privacy, resilience, and security control effectiveness. | Golden datasets, red-team tests, RAG metrics, hallucination tests, authorization tests, latency/cost tests. | AI quality and risk posture are measured rather than assumed. |
| Manage | Treat, monitor, respond to, and continuously improve AI risks across production lifecycle. | Runbooks, model rollback, guardrail tuning, issue tracking, incident response, continuous evaluation. | AI risks have active treatment, monitoring, and response mechanisms. |
NIST AI 600-1 Generative AI Risk Taxonomy
| Risk Area | Design Implication | Recommended Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| CBRN Information or Capabilities | Model may generate or assist with harmful specialized knowledge. | Risk classify use case, restrict prohibited content, add refusal policy, log and escalate attempts. |
| Confabulation | Generated outputs may be plausible but false or unsupported. | Use RAG grounding, citations, confidence signals, output validation, and human review for high-impact decisions. |
| Dangerous, Violent, or Hateful Content | System may produce harmful or abusive outputs. | Apply input/output safety filters, policy enforcement, abuse monitoring, and escalation workflows. |
| Data Privacy | Prompts, context, memory, embeddings, logs, and outputs may expose sensitive data. | Use minimization, redaction, encryption, retention limits, tenant isolation, and prompt/log governance. |
| Environmental Impacts | Large models and high-volume inference increase compute, energy, water, and carbon footprint — at infrastructure and societal scale. | Use model routing, caching, batching, smaller models where acceptable, and token-budget controls. Measure energy consumption and report lifecycle emissions where required by governance. |
| Harmful Bias and Homogenization | Outputs may unfairly disadvantage groups or collapse diversity of viewpoint. | Measure bias, define representative test sets, tune retrieval sources, and apply review for sensitive domains. |
| Human-AI Configuration | Users may over-trust, under-supervise, or misunderstand AI outputs and autonomy. | Use disclosure, confidence cues, review gates, appeal paths, and clear human responsibility boundaries. |
| Information Integrity | Generated content may pollute decision records, knowledge bases, or public information ecosystems. | Label AI output, preserve provenance, validate before publication, and protect authoritative records. |
| Information Security | Prompt injection, data exfiltration, tool misuse, model abuse, and supply-chain compromise may occur. | Use Zero Trust access controls, retrieval authorization, tool policy engines, sandboxing, secrets isolation, and AI incident runbooks. |
| Intellectual Property | Inputs or outputs may create copyright, license, training-data, or proprietary-content exposure. | Track sources, restrict protected data use, add attribution review, and evaluate output reuse policy. |
| Obscene, Degrading, or Abusive Content | System may generate offensive or degrading content even when not explicitly requested. | Use content policy controls, safety classification, red-team tests, and user-reporting workflows. |
| Value Chain and Component Integration | Model providers, plugins, data pipelines, vector stores, and tools introduce third-party and supply-chain risk. | Maintain component inventory, vendor risk review, model/provider allowlists, SBOM-style evidence, and change control. |
EU AI Act Risk Classification
| Risk Tier | Examples Relevant to LLM/GenAI Systems | Architecture Obligations |
|---|---|---|
| Prohibited | Social scoring by public authorities; real-time remote biometric ID in public spaces; subliminal manipulation systems; exploiting vulnerable groups. | Hard block at design time. No system may be built that enables these practices. No configuration option should allow it. |
| High Risk | AI in recruitment/HR decisions, credit scoring, educational assessment, critical infrastructure management, law enforcement, migration and border control, administration of justice. | Conformity assessment before market placement; technical documentation; human oversight controls; accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity standards; bias testing; logging sufficient for post-market monitoring; registration in EU AI Act database. |
| Limited Risk | Chatbots and virtual assistants; AI-generated content (deepfake text, audio, video); emotion recognition systems. | Transparency obligations: users must be informed they are interacting with AI. AI-generated content must be labeled. Maintain disclosure controls in the UI layer. |
| Minimal Risk | Spam filters; AI-enabled games; recommendation systems with no significant impact on rights. | No mandatory obligations, but voluntary code of practice recommended. |
| GPAI Models | Foundation models / general-purpose AI models (e.g., GPT-4, Claude, Gemini) used as components. | Model providers must maintain technical documentation and comply with copyright law. Systemic-risk GPAI models face additional adversarial testing, incident reporting, and cybersecurity obligations. Deployers must understand upstream provider obligations. |
Multi-Framework Mapping
| Framework | Primary Focus | Key Design Contributions | Relationship to Others |
|---|---|---|---|
| NIST AI RMF 1.0 | Governance and risk lifecycle | Govern/Map/Measure/Manage lifecycle; trustworthiness characteristics; risk ownership | Foundation governance layer; 600-1 extends for GenAI |
| NIST AI 600-1 | Generative AI–specific risks | 12 GenAI risk categories; design implications unique to foundation model systems | Supplements AI RMF for LLM/GenAI deployments |
| NIST AI 100-2e2025 | Adversarial ML attack vocabulary and taxonomy | Formal classification of AML attacks: evasion, data poisoning, backdoor/trojan, model extraction, membership inference, prompt injection and misuse (GenAI-specific); mitigation methods per attack class; covers both predictive AI (PredAI) and generative AI (GenAI) threat surfaces | Vocabulary layer — standardises attack terminology across ATLAS, OWASP, and security EPIC controls; informs red-team scenario design and evaluation harness test categories |
| EU AI Act | Mandatory legal compliance (EU) | Risk tiers, prohibited practices, high-risk obligations, GPAI model rules | Legal layer; must be satisfied before AI RMF and 600-1 controls are designed |
| US Sector-Specific Compliance | Federal and state legal obligations (US) | No single comprehensive US federal AI law exists. Compliance is sector-specific: HIPAA (health AI), FCRA/ECOA/Fair Housing Act (credit and lending AI), FDA SaMD framework (medical device AI), SEC disclosure rules (investment AI), FTC Act (unfair/deceptive AI practices), DOJ ECCP (corporate AI compliance), state laws (CO AI Act, CA Transparency Act, NYC Local Law 144) | Legal layer for US-deployed systems; must be layered over AI RMF governance; state laws remain enforceable pending federal preemption resolution |
| MITRE ATLAS | Adversarial ML threat technique enumeration | Specific attack techniques: model extraction, poisoning, evasion, prompt injection, inversion — mapped to real-world incidents | Technique library; AI 100-2e2025 provides the vocabulary; ATLAS provides the specific technique instances; OWASP translates to application controls |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | Application-layer LLM risks | Prompt injection, insecure output handling, data poisoning, excessive agency, overreliance | Application control layer; maps ATLAS techniques and AI 100-2e attack classes to concrete developer controls |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | Enterprise cybersecurity lifecycle | Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover; now includes Govern function | Operational security backbone; AI-specific controls map onto CSF functions |
SPA Framework and Standards Stack
| Layer | Framework / Standard | Scope | Binding? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal — EU | EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) | Mandatory compliance for EU-deployed or EU-user systems; risk tiers, prohibited practices, high-risk AI obligations, GPAI rules | Mandatory (EU) |
| Legal — US | US Sector-Specific: HIPAA · FCRA · ECOA · Fair Housing Act · FDA SaMD · SEC AI Disclosure · FTC Act · DOJ ECCP · State AI Laws (CO, CA, NYC) | No single federal AI law; compliance is sector- and state-specific. All remain enforceable until federal preemption is resolved through legislation or litigation. | Mandatory where applicable (US) |
| Governance | NIST AI RMF 1.0 | Govern, Map, Measure, Manage lifecycle; trustworthiness characteristics; risk ownership and accountability | Voluntary (strongly recommended) |
| GenAI Risk Taxonomy | NIST AI 600-1 (March 2024) | 12 generative AI–specific risk areas; design implications and treatment guidance for LLM/GenAI systems | Voluntary |
| AML Attack Vocabulary | NIST AI 100-2e2025 | Formal taxonomy of adversarial ML attacks (evasion, poisoning, backdoor/trojan, extraction, inference, prompt injection); covers PredAI and GenAI; mitigation methods; establishes common terminology across all other frameworks | Voluntary |
| Threat Techniques | MITRE ATLAS | Specific adversarial ML attack techniques mapped to real-world incidents; technique-level threat modeling | Voluntary |
| Application Controls | OWASP LLM Top 10 | Application-layer LLM risks and developer controls; maps AI 100-2e attack classes to implementable mitigations | Voluntary |
| Security Lifecycle | NIST CSF 2.0 | Enterprise cybersecurity Identify / Protect / Detect / Respond / Recover / Govern lifecycle; AI controls map onto CSF functions | Voluntary |
US AI Compliance — Sector-Specific Obligations
| Sector / Law | AI Relevance | Architecture Obligations | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIPAA | AI systems handling protected health information (PHI) — clinical decision support, patient communication, diagnostics | PHI minimisation in prompts and retrieval; encrypted audit logs; data residency; BAA with model providers; access controls on embeddings and memory | Federal — enforceable |
| FCRA / ECOA / Fair Housing Act | AI used in credit scoring, lending, insurance underwriting, or housing decisions | Explainability for adverse action; disparate impact testing; human review; audit trails; model documentation for regulators | Federal — enforceable |
| FDA Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) | AI/ML in medical devices, clinical decision tools, drug development | Pre-market approval or clearance; performance validation; post-market monitoring; change control for model updates | Federal — enforceable |
| FTC Act (Section 5) | Unfair, deceptive, or discriminatory AI practices in consumer-facing systems | Truthful AI capability claims; non-discriminatory outputs; user disclosure of AI involvement; data handling transparency | Federal — enforceable |
| SEC AI Disclosure Rules | AI use in investment decisions, portfolio management, financial advice, or material risk | Disclosure of AI use in filings; conflict-of-interest management; explainability for investment recommendations | Federal — enforceable |
| DOJ ECCP (AI Addendum, Sept 2024) | Corporate AI used in compliance functions — documentation, approvals, reporting | Assessment of criminal compliance risk from AI; controls on AI-generated data accuracy; prevention of AI-generated false approvals | Federal — enforceable |
| Colorado AI Act | High-risk AI decisions affecting consequential decisions (employment, credit, education, healthcare, housing) | Impact assessments; bias testing; user disclosure; appeal rights; effective date June 30, 2026 | State (CO) — effective June 2026 |
| California AI Transparency Act | AI-generated content disclosure for systems serving California users | Label AI-generated content; disclosure controls in UI layer; effective January 1, 2026 | State (CA) — effective Jan 2026 |
| NYC Local Law 144 | Automated employment decision tools used in NYC hiring or promotion | Annual bias audit by independent auditor; public disclosure of audit results; candidate notification | City (NYC) — enforceable |
| TAKE IT DOWN Act (2025) | AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII / deepfakes) | Removal mechanisms for flagged content; content safety controls; federal criminal liability for non-compliance | Federal — enacted 2025 |
AI Design Questionnaire
Generated Assessment
AI Design Factors
Model Inference
- Provider, model class, region, latency, context window, fallback, and cost controls.
- Trade-off: quality and reasoning depth versus latency, cost, and data handling restrictions.
Retrieval and Grounding
- Source ingestion, chunking, embeddings, vector index, source ranking, citations, and authorization.
- Trade-off: grounded answers versus retrieval latency and governance complexity.
- Authorization must occur at retrieval time — never only post-generation.
Agent Orchestration
- Planner, state machine, tool registry, approval gates, retry policy, and compensating actions.
- Trade-off: automation speed versus control, auditability, and safety.
Tool Execution
- Read-only, write, privileged, financial, customer-facing, and cloud-admin action classes.
- Trade-off: operational leverage versus blast-radius and misuse risk.
Memory and Privacy
- Session memory, approved long-term memory, tenant memory, retention, deletion, and consent.
- Trade-off: personalization versus privacy, retention, and leakage exposure.
Evaluation and Assurance
- Golden tests, red-team scenarios, prompt/version regression, retrieval quality, and guardrail metrics.
- Trade-off: confidence and repeatability versus evaluation cost and release friction.
Security EPICs
| EPIC | AI-Specific Scope | Required Controls | Design Trade-Off |
|---|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Users, service principals, model access, retrieval permissions, tool calls, agent roles, approval authority. | SSO/OIDC, RBAC/ABAC, workload identity, scoped tool credentials, just-in-time privileges, human approval gates — using established identity provider controls (Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM), not custom-named frameworks. | Strong control reduces misuse but can increase friction and integration work. |
| Data Protection | Prompts, documents, embeddings, memory, vector indexes, generated outputs, traces, and audit logs. | Classification, minimization, redaction, encryption, key management, tenant isolation, retention and deletion policy. | Stronger protection can reduce context richness and personalization. |
| Network and Application Security | Model endpoints, retrieval services, APIs, tool connectors, sandboxed execution, and egress paths. | Private endpoints, API gateway, WAF, egress allowlists, SSRF protection, sandboxing, rate limits, circuit breakers. | Restrictive network paths improve safety but reduce provider and tool flexibility. |
| Adversarial ML Controls (AI 100-2e2025) | Evasion attacks, data poisoning, backdoor/trojan injection, model extraction, membership inference, and GenAI-specific prompt injection and misuse — across both predictive AI and generative AI components. | Evasion: input validation, adversarial robustness testing. Poisoning: training data governance, retrieval corpus integrity checks. Backdoor/trojan: fine-tune data provenance, model integrity scanning. Extraction: query rate limits, output perturbation, watermarking. Membership inference: differential privacy techniques, output minimisation. Prompt injection: defence-in-depth controls (no complete mitigation exists). Use AI 100-2e2025 taxonomy as the vocabulary for all red-team test cases and evaluation harness categories. | Comprehensive AML controls add testing and operational complexity but are essential for systems exposed to adversarial users, fine-tuned models, or external data retrieval. |
| Logging and Monitoring | Prompt, retrieval, model, tool, latency, cost, policy, and output traces. | Redacted audit logs, correlation IDs, model-call telemetry, anomaly detection, cost monitoring, security alerts. | High visibility improves response but creates sensitive telemetry requiring governance. |
| Incident Response | Prompt injection, data leakage, unsafe output, runaway agents, compromised tool credentials, cost spikes. | Kill switches, credential revocation, tool-disablement, memory/index quarantine, forensic traces, runbooks, tabletop tests. | Containment controls may interrupt service but reduce blast radius. |
Secure Production Blueprint
Layer 1: Operations, Resilience, and Scale
- Capacity planning, quotas, request scheduling, autoscaling, cost controls, high availability, and degraded modes.
- Design triggers: high concurrent requests, strict latency targets, provider rate limits, GPU scarcity, or business-critical workflows.
Layer 2: Data Integrity and Vector Isolation
- Input validation, source provenance, chunking governance, embedding drift control, vector-store authorization, and tenant isolation.
- Design triggers: enterprise RAG, regulated records, frequent knowledge updates, or per-user document authorization.
Layer 3: Guarded Inference Pipeline
- User input capture, prompt policy, semantic cache, retrieval routing, model inference, output validation, and redaction.
- Design triggers: sensitive prompts, customer-visible outputs, hallucination risk, or response quality requirements.
Layer 4: Securing the Agentic Baseline
- Structured playbooks, tool registry, policy engine, execution sandbox, approval gates, audit trail, and kill switch.
- Design triggers: agents, external tools, write actions, cloud operations, customer-impacting tasks, or multi-step workflows.
Observe-Think-Act Threat Surface
- Observe: memory/context, retrieved documents, and external inputs. Think: prompt planning and reasoning chain. Act: tool calls, APIs, code, and workflow execution.
- Control each stage with validation, authorization, monitoring, and containment. No single defense is sufficient for indirect injection.
Diagnostic Playbook
- Symptoms: peak-traffic crashes, retrieval threat exposure, instruction override, fine-tune drift, hallucination, context saturation, and overfitting.
- Responses: inference scaling, retrieval isolation, prompt/firewall policy, retraining governance, grounding, progressive disclosure, and regularization.
Model Adaptation Matrix
| Method | Best Fit | Cost | Latency Impact | Data Privacy Risk | Forgetting Risk | Primary Trade-Off |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full Fine-Tuning | Foundational behavior change requiring deep domain adaptation | Very high — full training run | Unchanged at inference | Training data exposure risk; full dataset required. AI 100-2e2025: highest backdoor/trojan and poisoning risk of all adaptation methods — requires rigorous data provenance and post-training integrity scanning. | High — catastrophic forgetting of base capabilities | Maximum adaptation but very high cost, governance burden, data requirements, forgetting risk, and AML attack surface. Requires evaluation and integrity checks before each release. |
| LoRA (Low-Rank Adaptation) | Task or domain specialization with standard hardware | Moderate — partial parameter update | Minimal (adapter merged at inference) | Lower than full fine-tuning; still requires task dataset. AI 100-2e2025: poisoned training data can introduce backdoor/trojan triggers — validate data provenance. | Lower than full fine-tuning | Efficient adaptation with reasonable compute. Requires training data governance, provenance verification, and post-training evaluation. Does not require quantization. |
| QLoRA (Quantized LoRA) | Domain specialization under GPU memory constraints (4-bit quantized base model) | Low-moderate — 4-bit quantization reduces VRAM ~4× | Minimal; slight quality degradation possible vs LoRA at full precision | Similar to LoRA; training data required | Lower than full fine-tuning | Enables fine-tuning on consumer or lower-tier GPU hardware. Trade-off: potential precision loss vs standard LoRA. Choose LoRA over QLoRA when hardware allows. |
| PEFT (Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning family) | Umbrella term covering LoRA, QLoRA, prefix tuning, adapter layers, and prompt tuning — pick the specific method | Varies by method | Varies by method | Varies by method | Lower than full fine-tuning | Do not treat PEFT as a single method. Identify which PEFT technique is appropriate for your hardware, data, and quality requirements. |
| RAG | Dynamic, factual, and access-controlled knowledge that changes frequently | Low to variable — no training; retrieval and infra cost | Increased per-request retrieval step | Requires secure vector store and source access controls | None — does not modify model | Freshness and grounding improve significantly. Retrieval complexity and authorization become the critical design challenges. Best starting point before any fine-tuning. |
| Prompt Engineering | Behavior shaping, structured output, and persona without any training | Low — no infrastructure | Minimal; adds tokens | Prompt content may expose system logic if leaked | None | Fastest iteration and zero training cost. Prompts can be brittle; protect from extraction. Should be the default first approach. |
| Model Distillation | Reduce a large model's behavior into a smaller, faster model for specific tasks | High — requires teacher model inference at scale | Significant latency improvement post-distillation | Requires generation of distillation dataset; indirect exposure risk | High — smaller model may not generalize | Strong latency and cost improvement for high-volume narrow tasks. Not suitable for general-purpose or broad-domain systems. |
| Continual Pre-Training | Adapting the foundational knowledge of a base model for a highly specialized domain (e.g., clinical, legal, scientific) | Extremely high — requires pre-training–scale compute (millions of GPU-hours for frontier models) | Unchanged at inference | Very high — requires large domain corpus; most sensitive approach | Very high — risks catastrophic forgetting of general capabilities | Not suitable for most enterprise teams. Requires access to pre-training infrastructure, large unlabeled domain corpora, and full model re-evaluation. Consider RAG or fine-tuning first. Only viable when no existing model has adequate domain coverage and the organization has research-scale compute. |
AI Engineering Coverage
LLM Fundamentals
Account for tokenization, context window, temperature, structured output, KV cache, model size, and model behavior constraints before capacity and UX targets are finalized.
Prompt Engineering
Design prompt templates, system instructions, output parsers, prompt chaining, edge-case handling, multilingual behavior, and prompt injection defenses as versioned assets. No perfect injection defense exists — design for detection, not prevention alone.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluate chunking, embeddings, hybrid search, reranking, metadata filtering, source attribution, GraphRAG, freshness, access control, and multi-hop retrieval. Authorization at retrieval time is mandatory — not post-generation.
AI Agents and Agentic Systems
Design tool definitions, Model Context Protocol (MCP) boundaries, ReAct or plan-and-execute flows, memory, agent loop termination, orchestration, recovery, and human approval.
Fine-Tuning and Model Adaptation
Choose prompt engineering, RAG, LoRA, QLoRA, full fine-tuning, distillation, or (rarely, with research-scale infrastructure) continual pre-training based on data stability, hardware, latency, cost, privacy, and forgetting risk.
Vector Databases and Embeddings
Plan embedding model choice, dimensionality, index strategy, metadata, multi-tenancy, drift, quantization, and search-quality benchmarking. Embeddings are derived sensitive data where source data is sensitive.
LLMOps and Production AI
Operationalize model serving, prompt versioning, model rollback, feature flags, rate limiting, token streaming, cost controls, model routing, and provider fallback.
Evaluation and Testing
Use golden datasets, regression tests, red teaming, hallucination detection, factual consistency checks, RAG metrics, agent evaluation, and continuous evaluation.
Safety, Ethics, and Responsible AI
Address hallucination, bias, privacy, explainability, misuse, copyright, audit trails, incident response, EU AI Act classification, high-risk AI conformity, and user appeal workflows.
Multimodal and Infrastructure Scale
Extend architecture for images, tables, audio, video, multi-modal RAG, GPUs, batching, speculative decoding, quantization, request priority, and edge or on-device deployment.
AI Pattern Playbook
| Pattern | Category | Core Idea | When to Use | Trade-Off | Security Consideration |
|---|
Distributed-System Concepts
| # | Concept | Category | Core Idea | AI Relevance | Trade-Off | Security |
|---|
Trade-Off Register
| Decision Area | Selected Bias | Rejected / Deferred Option | Why | Risk Accepted |
|---|